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ABSTRACT

In this paper, the Policy Process Model developed by Charles O. Jones is adopted in order to analyze school desegregation policy in Portland, Oregon. A major focus of this case study is the interaction between the Portland Public School Board and two community groups (the Community Coalition for School Integration and the Black United Front) as the Board initiated adjustments in its desegregation program in order to comply with State guidelines. Also highlighted are key internal and external adjustments made by the school organization as a result of community pressures during the implementation of desegregation policy. The Jones Policy Process Model is reduced to three fundamental stages (policy formation, policy implementation, and policy impact), and the developments of each stage are outlined for the case of Portland. The blurring of boundaries between the three stages is described, and the consequent necessity for examining both the intended and unintended consequences of desegregation is stressed. (Author/GC)

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# School Desegregation: Portland Style

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School Desegregation: Portland Style

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## Introduction

Perhaps the most controversial United States national policy for equalizing educational opportunity for Black Americans is the Brown v. Topeka Board of Education decision which was rendered in 1954. This Supreme Court decision, coupled with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Green v. New Kent County decision, required school districts to integrate students, activities and faculties. In short, the Federal remedy for the Brown decision was to eliminate Black schools or other minority group schools and white schools. The ideal was to move from dual to unitary school systems. America would just have schools.

When the Brown decision was delivered, the compliance tasks were relatively clear for board members and administrators in Southern and border states. By contrast, courts have encountered considerable difficulty in applying the Brown doctrine to school systems in the North and West. And in these regions of the United States, school board members and administrators face desegregation policy implementation dilemmas. Some school districts are now beginning to question the intent of Brown because of many unforseen consequences of developing programs to overcome de facto segregation.

In an effort to better understand the dynamics of school desegregation in the North and West, U.S. Office of Education and National Institute of Education officials have recently issued RFP's to document and analyze the effectiveness of school desegregation methods in the North and West. With systematic studies of desegregation in Northern and Western communities, Board members, administrators and teachers will be able to improve program design alternatives.

The present case study focuses on school desegregation dynamics in the Northwest. Portland is Oregon's largest metropolitan school district. Since the early seventies, Portland's school desegregation program has consisted of a mix of administrative transfers, magnet high schools, middle schools, early childhood education centers and on-going attendance boundary changes to meet Oregon Department of Education regulations on racial imbalance in the schools. A major focus of this case study is upon the interaction between the Portland Public School Board and two community groups -- the Community Coalition for School Integration and the Black United Front -- as the Board initiated a series of incremental adjustments in its desegregation program to comply with state guidelines contained in Oregon State Board of Education Policy 4171 on Racial Imabalance. This study also highlights some of the key internal and

external adjustments made by the school organization as a result of community pressures during the implementation of the desegregation policy.

Theoretical Framework

The Policy Process Model developed in the writings of Charles O. Jones (1977:3) serves as general frame of reference for this study. There is a growing body of literature on policy research. Key concepts from the literature are policy, policy formulation, policy making, policy research, policy studies and policy sciences. But review of the literature, reveals discussions of the policy process. Jones' work is one of the better theoretical treatments of the policy process framework.

According to the Jones Policy Process Framework, the following distinction can be made between policy ingredients:

GOALS: the desired ends to be achieved

PLANS OR PROPOSALS: specifi d means for achieving the goals

PROGRAMS: authorized means for achieving goals.

DECISIONS: specifications taken to set goals, develop plans, implement and evaluate programs.

EFFECTS: the measurable impacts of programs (intended and unintended; primary and secondary)

The significance of this framework is that it focuses the researcher to look beyond the policy formation stage. Often policy analysts and academicians look only to the

dynamics of policy formation and discount the importance of researching post-conversion activities. Although the governmental policy process can sometimes become very complex and the causal variables are frequently hidden the elements can be summarized as follows (Jones, 1977:10).

A) Problem to Government

Perception
Definition
Aggregation
Organization
Representation

B) Action in Government

Formulation
Legitimation
Appropriation

C) Government to Problem

Implementation

D) Policy to Government

Evaluation/Appraisal

E) Problem Resolution or Change

Resolution/Termination

The above summary does much to simplify the policy process, however, this author believes the Jones model can be further reduced to three major phases: 1) The Policy Formulation Phase; 2) The Policy Implementation Phase; and 3) The Policy Impact Phase.

Therefore, the Policy Formulation Phase incorporates phases A and B in the Jones framework. The Policy

Implementation phase incorporates phase C and the Policy Impact phase encompasses phases D and E in Jones' framework.

It is important to highlight these three major phases of the policy process because the present case study focuses primarily upon the policy impact phase and to a lesser degree upon the formation and implementation phases. An analysis of policy impact directs the researcher to focus upon policy evaluation. In short, this means that "individual programs are, in a sense, returned to government for review." At whatever level, the evaluation design will include several key activities. First is the specification of what is to be evaluated and the appropriate criteria. Second, some type of measurement activities are implemented in order to collect data. Third an analysis of the data is conducted and recommendations are generated.

In the case of Portland Public Schools desegregation policy, the intended and unintended consequences are now being returned to the Board and the Superintedent for review; the unintended consequences of a series of desegregation policy decisions initiated in 1964 have been the central policy issue before the Board from 1978 to the present.

Methods/Techniques

The methodology is essentially a case study of one school district's policy process. Specifically, it explores the

school desegregation policy process. The authors have reviewed the major documents which place into historical perspective the school districts desegregation policy and have been participant-observers in the community's response to desegregation policy formation. As participant-observers, discussions have been initiated with community groups, parents, journalists, School Board members, administrators, teachers and education association officials.

## Data

### Policy Formation

Portland is located in the Northwest corner of the state. It is a port city located at the intersection of the Willamette and Columbia Rivers; it is a major commercial and shipping center for the Pacific Northwest.

Figures from the 1970 census estimated Portland's as 383,000 with Black residents numbering just over 21,500 (5.6 percent of the city's population). Persons of Hispanic origin totalled about 10,300 (2.6 percent) and Native-Americans constituted a small proportion of the city's population.

Portland Public School district enrollment has declined constantly from a high of 77,445 in 1968 to approximately 53,000 at the present. Student distribution in the district is approximately 13.8 percent Black, 3.3 percent Asian-American, 1.6 percent Hispanic and 1.3 percent Native-American.

According to 1977-78 data, staff distribution totalled 5,873 including 91.1 percent Anglo, 6.8 percent Black, 1.4 percent Asian-American, 0.7 percent Hispanics and 0.6 percent Native-American.

The main impetus for public school desegregation in Portland was spearheaded by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People during the sixties. The NAACP's activities led to the establishment of an independent, blue ribbon committee in 1963. This blue ribbon group was called the Committee on Race and Education (CRE) and was chaired by Judge Herbert M. Schwab. In 1964 the CRE issued recommendations to Portland Public School officials concerning desegregation, the creation of model schools and special programs for disadvantaged students. A major recommendation of CRE was that the district should use every means available not only to prevent racial isolation, but to correct existing racial isolation situations (Schwab, 1964).

One district response to the CRE report was the creation of an "open schools" policy whereby parents could request that their children be granted admission to schools other than their neighborhood schools on a space available basis. This program was clearly a response to the school district's policy to provide for equal educational opportunity. On a more comprehensive basis, the district established the Model Schools Program which included developing enriched

programs at ten low-achievement level schools, the open enrollment program allowing parents to transfer students to other schools (parents absorbed the transportation costs) and the administrative transfer program which was a busing program sending Black students to predominantly white schools in other parts of the district and participating suburban districts.

The Portland NAACP went on record as opposing the Model Schools approach and suggested that this strategy only sustained racial isolation, and parent and citizen groups began to ask for input in shaping alternatives for ending de facto school segregation (Oregonian, November 16, 1964). Many Black citizens saw the models schools approach as an avoidance of school integration with the effect of prolonging de facto segregation (Oregonian, March 10, 1965). The open enrollment plan was, in fact, seen as perpetuating segregation because both white and Black parents could request the transfer of their children. Of major concern was the Jefferson High School (predominantly Black) attendance area, where it was feared white parents would send their children elsewhere, further decreasing the white minority at that school (Oregonian, April 7, 1965).

From 1964 to 1969, the School Board and district administrators received considerable criticism by parents and citizens' groups in the Albina (predominantly Black) neighborhood for perpetuating de facto segregation through

the Model Schools Plan and the open enrollment plan. Enriching the programs in the Albina area did not change the statistic that 80-90 percent of the city's Black students were still confined to a handful of schools. The situation had reached a critical point by January 1969, when the Model Cities Education Committee attacked the School Board for failing to meet its stated goals for school desegregation. On January 13, 1969, the Oregonian carried an article which accused the School Board of unresponsiveness to community needs and desires. The Model Cities Education Committee's Urban Affairs Report called for the School Board's commitment to total integration by 1970, a phasing out of the Model Schools program, establishing a Citizen's Advisory Board to review all policies related to schools in the Model Cities area, a moratorium on construction of all new neighborhood schools until a comprehensive desegregation plan was devised, implementation of a grade exchange plan whereby all seventh and eighth grade students would attend schools in the Model Cities area and a restructuring of high school boundaries so a more equitable cross-section of the population would be represented in each school area.

The School Board was further charged by the Model Cities Education Committee with failing to adequately involve residents and parents in decisions to launch the Model Schools Plan, which resulted in a lack of parent support for the

educational programs in the Model Cities neighborhoods. One proposal of Urban Affairs Report was for establishment of an Experimental Learning Center in the Model Cities area, with a highly innovative program open to all students in the district. A citizens' policy board was recommended to control personnel and budget, plan and review the curriculum, and assist in teacher evaluation. An Oregonian article (January 13, 1969) ended with the quote: "It is essential that parents play a policy rather than an advisory role in this school in order to assure that the school reflects the needs of the community." On the rising tide of criticism over the school district's inadequate response to the problems of segregation and inequitable education for the city's youngsters, the School Board initiated a national search for a top chief executive to provide leadership for the school system. In the spring of 1969, Robert Blanchard was selected by the School Board as Portland Superintendent.

Policy Implementation

In January 1970 Blanchard submitted a master plan entitled "Portland School for the Seventies" to the School Board. This plan was adopted by the Board on March 23, 1970. There were several elements in the plan including decentralization plans and reorganization of the district into three areas. Boundaries for these three areas were drawn up so that each area included a piece of the Albina neighborhood.

Area One, encompassing the entire western part of the district, stretched across the Willamette River to include Jefferson High School and Humboldt Elementary School from the Albina community. Area Two, basically the easternmost sections of the district, reached into Albina to include King Elementary. Area Three, the east central part of the district, included Boise, Eliot, Sabin and Irvington Elementary Schools. Three citizen advisory committees were "to advise the Area Superintendent concerning the educational program building needs and operation of the schools in that area." (Portland Public Schools, 1970:3). These Committees were to be bound at all times by and adhere to the policies of the Board although they were empowered to submit written recommendations to the Board (Ibid.).

Against this background and within this framework one can begin to understand the dynamics of desegregation policy implementation and impact. Moreover, it is important to keep this background in mind as we turn our attention to the circumstances surrounding the presentation and public reception of the Blanchard plan.

"Portland Schools for the Seventies," originally calling for four subdistricts, was for the stated purpose of achieving school integration. A 4-4-4 system of K-4 neighborhood schools, fifth through eighth grade middle schools and high schools was part of the plan. In each of the four sub-

districts, the percent of Black students was to range from 7-11 percent and no middle school or high school was to have more than 25 percent Black students (Oregonian, January 21, 1970). Two days after release of the Blanchard plan, the Urban League's board gave unanimous endorsement to the plan (Oregonian, January 23, 1979), followed by an endorsement from the Portland Association of Teachers (Oregonian, January 24, 1970).

The plan was taken to the citizens in a series of four carefully planned public hearings scheduled in each of the four proposed areas of the city. The format for these hearings consisted of a narrated slide presentation, packets of information on the plan handed out to all participants (packets included the verbatim text of the plan and a map of the decentralized areas) and a panel of Board members and Blanchard to answer questions. Detailed notes were taken of all citizen comments, although the notes were not consistently summarized and presented in a workable way to the Board for its review. Cards were provided for participants to submit written questions and give their names and addresses for a phone or written response subsequent to the meeting.

Citizen attendance was high at these meetings (the four hearings attracted approximately 2000 people) and sentiment followed some common themes. The account in the Oregonian of February 3, 1970, following one of the public hearings, is representative:

--"400 skeptical parents seek further information on changes within the schools."

--Citizens ask if reorganization plan can go to a vote of the people instead of being decided by the School Board.

--A spokesman from the Jefferson High School student body objected to any plan which would disrupt the student balance that was then prevailing at Jefferson (55 percent white, 43 percent Black, 2 percent Oriental).

--A citizen objected to the plan because it would break up Albina--"Split up the Black forces." This citizen wanted to know how the plan would affect the Model Cities Program and Head Start; also wondered why busing couldn't occur both ways--of both Black and white students.

As the public hearings continued, Blanchard was frequently reported in the Portland newspapers clarifying aspects of the plan:

--Oregonian, February 10, 1970: "Busing played down in city school plan." Blanchard says he will recommend no mandatory busing of high school students as part of his overall plan. He cannot guarantee that there will not be some involuntary busing at the high school level, but the degree depends on things like population shifts and school-building capacities.

--Oregonian, February 10, 1970: Blanchard says further that avoiding serious racial imbalances does not mean all Portland schools will have enrollments with 25 percent Blacks. Some schools will have no Blacks and others will have varying percentages. "The objective is to avoid isolation of minority children."

On February 26, 1970, the Oregonian reported that the Urban League again endorsed the Blanchard plan and so did the Model Cities Education Committee, with the following stipulations:

1. A public hearing be held at Jefferson High School for citizen input from that area.

2. The school district staff be racially balanced to reflect the racial percentage of overall school enrollment.

3. Subdistrict superintendents be chosen for their understanding of human problems.

4. More programs be developed for non-college bound students.

5. Subdistrict advisory boards consist of persons whom neighborhood residents accept as representing their interests.

On March 5, 1970, the Oregonian reported that the Portland Federation of Teachers "shuns school plan." The PFT stated that teachers need to be assured that sweeping plans for change call for quality improvement in education, whereas it appeared to PFT that the Blanchard plan was attending only to structural change. The PFT further stated it saw no evidence yet of commitment to teacher or community involvement "in the planning of educational improvement and change prior to decision making by the School Board."

A March 6, 1970, editorial in the Oregonian said the public hearings had disclosed, among other things, that there was "widespread apprehension that the Blanchard recommendations are a 'fate accompli' rather than a plan for Board approval, rejection or amendment."

A survey by the PFT and several local organizations showed Albina residents opposing the plan by 2-1 and asking for a hearing on the plan in the Albina area (Oregonian, March 12, 1970). Of the 424 people surveyed, 60 percent opposed the way the plan divided Albina, opposed busing for racial integration and opposed the 25 percent limit on Black student attendance. Two-thirds of those surveyed wanted

Jefferson High School maintained as a community school and not subject to the 25 percent Black student limitation.

By March 12, the Blanchard plan was revised to recommend three subdistricts instead of four. In a March 13, 1970 Oregonian article, Blanchard was reported as being convinced by suggestions at the public hearings that the overall educational improvement plan could be accomplished better with three districts, which could a ccomplish middle school and integration objectives with less drastic changes in existing high school attendance boundaries.

School board members expressed concern over degrees of subdistrict autonomy and citizen proposals for elected area advisory boards. One school board member was quoted as saying he would be reluctant to "fragment the authority of the Board for dealing with the overall school problems" (Oregonian, March 15, 1970). Most other board members were reported as questioning the merit of advisory boards because they could create divided political forces within the school district and "pose a real problem by pitting area against area." (Ibid.)

A group of concerned citizens, Citizens Committee for Better Schools, went on record in favor of a high degree of autonomy for subdistrict superintendents in such matters as curriculum development, establishing educational priorities and funding expenditure decisions. This group also wanted area advisory boards to include a cross-section of residents,

students, teachers and persons of different races, cultures and income levels. The Citizens Committee also recommended that members be selected by a petition/appointment process--their expression of interest through petition and then selection and appointment by an independent committee, not by the School Board. They suggested membership on the advisory groups be half white and half Black (Oregonian, March 15, 1970).

The chairman of the NAACP Education Committee labeled the Blanchard plan "a scheme to weaken and frustrate black unity" and attacked the "racist philosophy of placing small numbers of blacks among whites" (Oregonian, March 16, 1970).

On March 23, 1970, the School Board adopted the proposed reorganization plan. Except for changes regarding the number of subdistricts and their boundaries, the plan was largely unchanged from its original form.

Policy Impact: 1970-Present

The issue of one-way busing--of Black children out of predominantly black neighborhoods into white neighborhoods--has been a recurring source of contention in the years since adoption of the Portland Schools for the Seventies plan. In the fall of 1972, the district's administrative transfer program was expanded, with participation primarily from the district's inner city schools. By 1975, more than 2,000 Black students were bused each day from their neighborhoods

to predominantly white schools. White students were not bused into the black community. Some white schools received as few as three Black students; others received around 50, resulting in varying racial compositions among the "integrated" schools. The percentage of Black students in these schools ranged from 1.4 percent to 10.4 percent, withthe average being 6.7 percent. In a school of 500, for example, there might be 33 Black students (Johnson, 1975:6).

In 1977, citizen concern over the community's role in educational planning and school board/administration relations to the community was further aggravated by presentation of the Newman Plan for further desegregation of Portland schools and the prevention and elimination of "racial isolation" of minority children (Newman, 1977). Author of this plan was Jonathan Newman, member of the Portland School Board since 1968. The Newman Plan basically was a proposal to eliminate racial isolation at Jefferson High School by prohibiting students from the Boise and King neighborhoods (predominantly Black) from attending Jefferson, their neighborhood high school. Under the proposal these students would attend Lincoln and Wilson High Schools except in unusual circumstances.

This plan was opposed by many citizens, particularly in the Black community. No citizen input was sought prior to presentation of the Newman draft to the School Board, and

attempts at input after presentation of the plan appeared to be resented. As expressed in the Oregon Journal, June 23, 1977: "The new Boise-King plan is asking the Black community to endure another in a series of wrenching disruptions in order to satisfy arithmetic demands based on quotas...Before the School Board begins to consider the new Boise-King plan, it must carry the proposal to the communities involved and hear from the parents and students who have a bigger stake than satisfying an administrative quota."

Citizen frustration at this lack of response from Board members and administrators resulted in 27 community groups and 72 individuals banding together to form the Community Coalition for School Integration (CCSI). On July 25, 1977, the Board asked the NAACP, Urban League and Metropolitan Human Relations Commission to develop alternative recommendations for addressing the problem of racial imbalance at Jefferson. These three organizations extended an open invitation to any group or individual to participate with them in responding to the School Board's proposed policy.

It soon became apparent, according to an informational bulletin issued by CCSI, that a district-wide examination of desegregation policy was necessary (Community Coalition, 1978). The Coalition presented its findings on the Jefferson attendance area to the School Board on December 15, 1977. In

January 1978, the Board adopted the Coalition's recommendation to drop the high school redistricting plan for the Boise-King area.

To receive input from the community, CCSI sponsored 15 forums throughout the district. A forum was held in every high school neighborhood in the district, with the main purpose of receiving input from citizens regarding the questions, concerns and opinions they have about school desegregation in Portland.

More than 400 citizens attended the forum series. Participants included parents from all Portland high schools and 41 of the 87 elementary schools. Format for the forums involved a panel presentation on the Coalition and Portland's school desegregation efforts, followed by open discussion. Audience questions, concerns and opinions were recorded and presented in the form of a report to the School Board. Forum participants also filled out a questionnaire in which they indicated what they perceived to be the most important issues involved in school desegregation in Portland. Results of the questionnaire were tabulated and included in the forum report.

The CCSI raised funds through private donations to support its research. In addition to the community survey of needs and desires relative to integration, a massive study was conducted of the past 13 years of desegregation in the Portland District. The CCSI submitted its report, with

recommendations, to the School Board in November 1978. The report, "Equity For The Eighties" was very comprehensive. Among its recommendations were administrative concerns, student transfers, curriculum, teacher training, student discipline, minority hiring, minority teacher placement, integrated housing, advisory boards and future board relationships with the CCSI. Of the list of recommendations, the most important issue was the question of equity in carrying out the desegregation program. The Coalition contended that "The Portland School District has not carried out school desegregation in an equitable manner." There was no question that the Board had attempted to address the desegregation issue but the burden of desegregation was placed upon Black students. The Coalition proposed to end this inequity by pairing each of seven grade schools (predominantly Black) with one or two schools with predominantly white enrollments. The strategy was to bus the lower-grade-level students in each of the pairs to one of the schools and the upper-grade-level students to the other paired school.

The School Board deferred to the professional expertise of Superintendent Blanchard to shape the appropriate response to the CCSI recommendation on pairing. Blanchard's response was printed and bound and he had a slide presentation to complement his speech. His strategy was to make concessions on each of the ten recommendations in order to hold firm on

the pairing proposal.

The CCSI had made it clear that the issue of student transfers was the most important. This was the crucial part of its report. Based upon its research, the Coalition had produced some very pursuasive evidence that because they were no longer neighborhood schools at their grade level, hundreds of Black students (some against their will) are transported out of their community. Far fewer whites participated in the "voluntary" transfer program. Some parents send their children into the Albina community to attend Early Childhood Education Centers. But those whites who come into the Albina schools are almost all at the first-grade levels. According to one education journalist, Blanchard responded to the CCSI recommendations by using a variety of techniques (Willamette Week, December 25, 1978).

- He used misleading numbers, while trying to show the Coalition's pairing plan wouldn't work.
- He used misleading figures to refute the charge that the burden of desegregation falls on Black students.
- He raised the specter of "white flight" as a justification for not pairing.
- Without real explanation, he suggested a plan to the board that reduced the scattering effect of current practices, but left intact the fundamentals of Portland's one-way forced busing.

Superintendent Blanchard further suggested to the Board and the public that there were some logistical constraints with the pairing proposal "that have to do with

numbers of students, size of facilities, and racial percentages."

In order to meet the Coalition's objective (and maintain stability in the program) "to reduce below 50 percent minority any school that is over that figure, an initial allocation of students on a 70-30 ratio would appear prudent and necessary," according to Blanchard. Stated differently, an allocation of a maximum of 30 percent minority enrollment initially among the sending and receiving pairs would be required.

A 70-30 balance would involve a minimum of 25 schools in addition to the seven schools which were currently imbalanced. This strategy would involve close to 15,000 students, in contrast with an estimate of 6,000 in the CCSI projections.

On one point the Coalition and Blanchard agreed. There are 3,557 resident minority students in predominantly Black schools. A target of 14 west-side schools had a total enrollment of 5,119 non-Black student spaces for 6,375. Consequently, if each predominantly Black school was paired with two predominantly white schools, there was the potential for racial balance. However, the CCSI and Blanchard could not come together on the numbers. The interaction between the CCSI and Blanchard was lively. During this period school board meetings were lively and well attended. The stage was

set for a period of negotiation between these two factions. Blanchard asserted, in summation, that:

> The heart of the equity argument is the question of inconvenience. When we examine, districtwide, the results of reorganization, we find that the inconvenience of transfer due to reorganization has been almost equally shared by Black and white students... (Willamette Week, December 25, 1978.)

The superintendent felt strongly that the transporting of Blacks and whites to middle schools is not as unbalanced as CCSI data suggested. Some observers suggested that Blanchard was truly attempting to head off "white flight" and further enrollment decline. Others suggested that he used the "white flight" argument as a political ploy.

About August of 1979 another interest group entered the public school desegregation negotiations. This group -- The Black United Front (BUF) -- began to review the various desegregation proposals. The alternative school desegregation proposals -- two drawn by the board's desegregation committee and another proposal by a parent advisory committee -- attempted to keep forced busing to a minimum and rely on voluntary student transfers. But according to Rev. John Jackson, BUF co-chairman, "the two main plans both 'ducked' the issue of forcing white students to attend school in the Black community"(Oregonian, November 28, 1979).

The Black United Front had threatened to boycott the schools in the fall of 1979 if the Portland School Board

did not meet its demands (see appendix for Black United Front Demands). The BUF originally decided to call off its boycott for twelve weeks based upon the School Board's adoption of a set of measures to improve desegregation practices. As the School Board was shaping responses to their demands, BUF remained relatively silent. BUF which supposedly was speaking for a large percentage of the district's 8,000 Black students chose not to appear before the Board during the deliberations. Then during the latter part of December, 1979, a press conference was held and BUF called for the resignation of Superintendent Blanchard.

None of the three proposals offered by the Board could meet the stern criteria established by BUF, according to its co-chairmen Rev. John Jackson and Ron Herndon. The BUF leadership charged Blanchard with "allowing Black students to be unfairly disciplined and 'destructively' bused all over the city. They also charged that the Portland schools haven't tried hard enough to hire Black teachers and administrators."

BUF leadership summarized their feelings towards the superintendent by saying that "we feel that the planning of our children's future and the implementation of that plan should not be shaped by the man who has caused so much suffering to our children."

School Board chairman Frank McNamara at this time went on record in support of the superintendent and said "I have no intention of considering seriously a change in superintendent." McNamara indicated that the Front wrongly blamed all its complaints about the school system on the superintendent. Moreover, said McNamara, whichever desegregation plan was finally adopted would be easier to put into effect with Blanchard than with a new superintendent.

In summary we might observe that there has been an evolution of interest group activity in regard to school desegregation policy and programs. The Black United Front remains one of several organizations which seek to articulate, to the Portland School Board, the sentiments of the district's 8,000 Black students. Organizations such as the NAACP, the Urban League, the Metropolitan Human Relations Commission and the Community Coalition for School Integration seem to take less extreme positions as compared to the Black United Front. These organizations, singularly and collectively, have played a key role in attempting to gain adjustments in the district's desegregation policy so that the impact of the district's desegregation decisions will not fall unfairly upon the Black community.

At this writing, the Board is holding marathon meetings in order to hammer out an acceptable desegregation plan and the BUF reamins as the district's main critic and advocate for Black students in the Albina community.

Analysis and Conclusions

For the purposes of structuring this case study, we adopted Jones Policy Process Model. The model posits five groups of activities encomapssing the policy process. Included in this process are: 1) Problem to Government; 2) Action in Government; 3) Government to Problem; 4) Policy to Government; and 5) Problem Resolution or Change.

Following a further analysis of the Jones Policy Process Model, the authors suggest that the model can be further reduced to three fundamental stages -- 1) Policy Formation; 2) Policy Implementation; and 3) Policy Impact. Superimposing this schema over the Jones Model; the authors suggest that the Policy to Government and Problem Resolution/change activities should be considered paramount in Policy Impact analysis; this phase, Policy Impact, is of prime importance to the authors.

Moving from the model to the data, the authors conclude that, with respect to school desegregation policy analysis, it is difficult to separate activities in to the discrete phases of formation, implementation, and impact; the political and emotional context of school desegregation policy almost renders the separation task impossible. As stated differently, the boundaries between desegregation policy formation,

implementation and impact become quite blurred as escalation of negotiations occur between community pressure groups, school board members and school administrators.

Specifically, as Portland Public School District decision makers have attempted to fashion school desegregation policies and programs, they have encountered difficulty in incorporating those elements which meet with the approval of both the Black and white communities.

An analysis of policy impact, must of necessity, include a treatment of intended and unintended consequences. Serving as a rationale for school district desegregation policy was the value of equalizing educational opportunity for Black students. The attendant plans were to racially balance school buildings in the Albina community. And, consequently, decisions about the allocation of Black and white students had to be made. Eight to ten years ago, this logic and strategy seemed to have some support of community and teachers' organizations. The fact that the Board is now under fire owes more to the fact that there has been a re-examination of desegregation/integration assumptions and goals as opposed to errors in planning.

But these two factors, in concert, have returned the desegregation policy to the chambers of the Portland School Board. The unintended consequences of Black students bearing the burden of school desegregation has precipitated the most important crises of the past ten years.

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## BLACK UNITED FRONT BOYCOTT OBJECTIVES

### Elimination of Busing Abuses of Black Children

1. Reduce scattering and isolation of Black students.
2. Minimum minority enrollment of 40% in schools engaged in transfers for desegregation.
3. Two-way transfer system must be used to achieve the minimum minority enrollment in desegregated schools.
4. Early Childhood Education program should be maintained provided every child in neighborhood wanting to attend can, and all white children transferring in remain in the ECE's feeder patterns.
5. Establish a minimum of two middle schools from among the schools in the Black community.

### Guarantee Quality Education for Black Children

1. Establish annual achievement improvement goals for each school involved in the desegregation program, and demonstrate to the public progressive improvement in achievement scores.
2. Strengthen general academic programs at both Jefferson and Adams, and insure that neither school is closed.
3. Establish the percent of minority students (20%) as the percent goal for minority hiring for teachers and all other staff in the district.
   A. Establish specific timeframe to accomplish this with yearly milestones.
   B. Establish goal for administrative staff at 20% minority.
4. Establish a plan for teacher placement that addresses current inequities and discrimination against minority teachers.
5. Establish a mandatory teacher training program in multi-ethnic education, Black history and culture, etc., for all teachers and staff employed in integrated school settings.
6. Include better, more representative teaching of minority cultures, particcularly Black culture, in the curriculum.

### Elimination of Disciplinary Abuses of Black Children

1. Establish a plan to correct inequities in disciplinary procedures for Black students.
2. Implement immediately the Coalition's recommendations on discipline categories.
3. Implement uniform and consistent rules/regulations for conduct on buses. No student should be put off the bus until their destination is reached.
4. Establish goals to reduce the disproportionate percent of Black students suspended and expelled and demonstrate progressive improvement in this area by reporting quarterly to the public.